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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN N. HALL, and ) 
RITA M. HALL, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs'Respondents, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
PERRY G. FITZGERALD, ) 
CAROLYN S. FITZGERALD, et al. ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
18371 
This is an action by the sellers of real property to treat a uniform 
real estate contract as a note and mortgage, to have the property sold at 
a foreclosure sale, and for judgment against the buyers for the deficiency. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties entered into a uniform real estate contract dated 
December 30, 1977, whereby plaintiffs sold to defendants 1 ,840 acres of 
undeveloped land in Cedar Valley, Utah County, for $460,000.00, payable 
$90,116.00 down and $40,000 annually until December 30, 1986, when the 
entire balance was payable (R 6,7). Defendants made the down payment and 
the annual payments in 1978 and 1979 (R 3, paragraph 5). Defendants paid 
$500.00 on October 15, 1980, but did not pay the balance of the annual 
payment due on December 30, 1980 (R 11). Plaintiffs filed suit in May 
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1981, after negotiations to settle the matter otherwise were unsuccess-
ful (R 2-4). Defendants in their Answer denied that Exhibit B to 
plaintiffs' Complaint was the contract entered into tecause it did not 
have a provision requiring plaintiffs as sellers to deed to defendants 
as buyers part of the land purchased when the annual payments were made 
(called release clauses) (R 11). Before any discovery was undertaken by 
either side, plaintiffs moved on September 18, 1981, for a summary judgment 
based on an affidavit of the plaintiff husband and the attorney for 
plaintiffs (R 12). On September 28, 1981, defendants moved to amend their 
.. 
Answer to assert a breach of the subject contract by plaintiffs (failure 
to pay plaintiffs' seller $30,000.00 due on the contract referred to in 
paragraph No. 6 of Exhibit B referred to above) and to reform the subject 
contract to set forth the release provision referred to above (R8'·5!). 
Without expressly ruling on defendants' Motion to Amend and without oral 
argument, the lower court entered a Judgment and Order for $401 ,464.71 
on November 23, 1981 (R 29, 30). Defendants filed a Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment on November 27, 1981 (R 32,33) on the following four grounds: 
(1) defendants' Motion to amend their Answer had not been ruled upon; 
(2) newly discovered evidence (defendants' payment of $40,000.00 to 
plaintiffs' sellers had been applied by them to plaintiffs' contract so 
plaintiffs had the benefit of that sum which was in fact an acceptance 
of the only payment due as a breach upon which the judgment was predicated; 
(3) judgment was not supported by a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law as required by Rule 56(d) of U.R.C.P.; (4) the judgment violated Sec. 
78-37-1, 2, U.C.A., 1953, as no money judgment is proper until after a 
sale of the property security as the proceeds might extinguish the debt. 
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The denial of that motion resulted in the Judgment of November 23, 1981, 
becoming final. The facts in support of the Motion last referred to and 
in support of both the Answer and the Proposed Amended Answer have never 
been found as there has been no evidentiary hearing needed to establish 
their existence or non-existence. Affidavit Leland 
A. Fitzgerald, plaintiffs' seller, generally supportsthese factual claims 
(R79). They were filed after the Summary Judgment but before the hearing 
on the Motion to Set Aside. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The lower court granted plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
November 23, 1981, without oral argument. Defendants Fitzgerald moved 
to set aside that judgment. The latter motion was denied on March 11, 
1982 (R 44). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the Judgment and Order of November 23, 1981, 
set aside, permit their proposed Amended Answer to be filed and to proceed 
to trial on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED A SUMMARY JUDGMENT ALTHOUGH 
THERE WERE MATERIAL FACTS CONCERNING WHICH THERE WAS A GENUINE 
DISPUTE, SPECIFICALLY WHETHER THE CONTRACT SUED UPON WAS THE 
CONTRACT THE PARTIES HAD ENTERED INTO SINCE IT HAD NO RELEASE 
PROVISION AND WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ACCEPTED THE PAYMENT 
MADE BY APPELLANTS TO KEEP THEIR OWN CONTRACT CURRENT AND 
THUS CURED THE BREACH ON WHICH THE JUDGMENT WAS BASED. 
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I n their answer of July 8, 1981, the appellants expressly alleged 
that the contract sued upon was not the contract entered into by the 
parties because the contract sued upon did not contain a "release provision 11 
(R 11). This clear denial of paragraph 2 of plaintiff's Complaint created 
a factual dispute which was most material to this lawsuit. There is 
nothing in the affidavit of either Calvin Hall, one of the respondents 
(R 14, 15) or in the affidavit of his attorney, Richard A. Rappaport 
(R 20, 21) which addresses this factual dispute at all. Such was the state 
of the record at the time the summary judgment was entered on November 23, 
1981 (R 29, 30). To deny appellants their opportunity to prove their 
factual assertions was error. Numberous decisions of this Court establish 
this proposition beyond dispute. Illustrative are the following recent 
cases on this point: 
In re Williams Estate, 10 Ut. 2d 83,348 P 2d 683 (1960) 
Anderson v. Granite Schoo 1 District, 413 P 2d 596 ( 1966) 
McBride v. Jones, 615 P 2d 432 (1980) 
Foster v. Salt Lake County, 632 P 2d 810 (1981) 
POINT II 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT NOT TO GRANT A TRIAL ON THE 
BASIS OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHICH CAME TO LIGHT AFTER 
THE ENTRY OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The judgment in question was predicated upon the failure of appellants 
to pay $40,000 on December 30, 1980. That amount was paid by appellants 
to Leland A. Fitzgerald, respondents' seller, who requested that it be 
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paid directly to him as he was fearful that respondents would not pay 
him the $30,000 due him on the contract referred to in paragraph 6 of 
the subject contract ( R ~,7). After the entry of the summary judgment 
in question, it came to appellants' attention that the respondents had 
utilized most, if not all, of the payment respondents made to preserve 
their interest in the subject property. Appellants timely moved to 
have the judgment appealed from set aside on the basis of that evidence 
( R 34, 35). 
No case has been found which deals with a new trial when there was 
not an initial trial because a surrrnary judgment proceeding was involved 
but the same principles of requiring the final resolution to reflect 
all_ the facts bearing on the merits should be as applicable to this 
case as to any other. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR THE BALANCE 
OF THE PURCHASE PRICE PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 16C OF THE UNIFORM 
. REAL ESTATE CONTRACT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION AND PROOF 
BY RESPONDENTS THAT THEY FULFILLED THE TERMS OF SAID CONTRACT 
BY "PASS TITLE TO BUYER SUBJECT THERET0. 11 
Respondents did not allege that they had passed title to appellants, 
only that they "tender title to buyer subject to said note and mortgage" 
( R 3, paragraph 9). 11 • • • far a party to recover upon a contract for 
nonperformance by the other party, he must establish his own performance 
or his offer and ability to perform or a valid excuse for his failure to 
perform" (Contracts, Sec. 355, 17 Am. Jur_., 2d 791). Here the offer 
to perform is not sufficient as the contract requires that the ~~ti-tle 
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pass." Respondents .did not allege they held title to said property. 
In fact they would not acquire title until they paid off the $297,377 
due Leland A. and Helen S. Fitzgerald on a uniform real estate contract 
referred to in paragraph 6 of the subject contract. Thus their complaint 
failed to state a cause of action and the Rule 12(h) of U.R.C.P. provides 
that the defense of failure to state a claim is not waived by failure to 
raise it by motion or in the answer. It could still be raised at a trial 
on the merits, a stage never reached in this case and for which this 
appeal is being prosecuted. 
Even if respondents held the title subject to the lien of the 
Fitzgeralds referred to above, the title which they must transfer to 
appellants to enforce 16C would be a good marketable title not one 
subject to an encumbrance and certainly not to one of the magnitude in 
question. To prevail on this point, respondents would have to contend 
that a deed which purported to pass title even by those who had not 
received a deed themselves from the record title holder suffices to 
rreet the contract terms and even if those grantors owe hundreds of 
thousands of dollars which must be paid off before the title is a 
marketable one. Such a proposition is so utterly unreasonable that 
appellants' counsel has made but a cursory search for a case in point. 
If the judgment in question is affirmed, respondents will have or 
may acquire (l) all the interest in the land they ~ver had (since no 
one would pay anything but a nominal sum for the appellants' interest 
which would be subject to the aforesaid $279,327 due to the bottom having 
fallen out of real estate of the type in question)(2) the full purchase price 
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including $170~000 paid prior to this suit. Of course, courts can not 
make their determinations dependent upon economic factors. However, 
they can insist on both sound principle and precedents that the seller 
of realty convey good title thereto before they will enforce a con-
tractual provision allowing judgment for the full price less payments 
made. If the price is to be full price, the title for which the price 
is payable must be full title. The cases so hold. The key word in 
paragraph l 6C of the subject contract is "title." Words and Phrases 
under"Title - to Property 11 on page 380 cites·Gillespie v. Broas, N. Y., 23 Barb 
370, 381, U. S. v. Hunter, 21 F. 615, 617 and Langmede v. Weaver, 60 NE 
9 9 2 , 9 9 7 , 6 5 0 h i o St . 1 7 as 1 ea di n g cases on th e mean i n g of " ti t 1 e . " In 
Gillespie the court said "Title of itself to real estate implies an estate 
in fee; nothing short is a complete title." In U. S. v. Hunter the 
court said: 
... A leasehold interest may be considered, for some 
purposes, a title, and sometimes the word "title" is used 
in a general sense so as to include any title or interest, 
and thus a mere leasehold interest; but here it is the 
title, and this, in common acceptance, means the fu,,--and 
absolute title; for when we speak of a man as having title 
to certain lands, the ordinary understanding is that he is 
the owner of the fee and not that he is a mere lessee; ... 
In Langmede the court said: 
... The Century Dictionary defines the word "convey" 
to mean, in law, "to pass title by deed," and the word 
"title 11 to mean the "ownership; absolute ownership; the 
unincumbered fee. 11 So that the petition sufficiently shows 
that Esselstein acquired the title to the land by legal 
conveyance, and that the possession of his tenants was 
lawfully held ... 
All these cases are ancient cases but the principles therein are 
aa true today as in 1856 with respect to the meaning of "title. 11 
It is evident that the respondent sellers did not fulfill the 
contract provisions of paragraph 16C as they never received title and 
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therefore could not convey title and even if they had title that title 
could not be encumbered by a lien of some $297 ,000 and "pass title" within 
the meaning of the contract terms. To permit judgment on such performance 
as the deed in this file (R gl.f ) was error. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT FOR $401 ,464.71 PRIOR TO THE 
TIME THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS SOLD AND THE RETURN SHOWS A BALANCE 
REMAINING DUE. 
In the case of First National Bank of Coalville vs. Boley, 61 P 2d 623 
(1936), this court said: 
We have held that under these sections there is no personal 
liability by the mortgagor until after a foreclosure sale of 
the security, and then only for the deficiency remaining unpaid, 
and that a mortgagee may not have a personal judgment against a 
mortgagor until the security has been first exhausted. See 
Zions Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Rouse, 86 Utah, 574, 47 P (2d) 
617; Blue Creek Land & Live Stock Co. ~- Kehrer, 60 Utah, 62 206 P 287. 
In the Zions case referred to above Justice Wolfe in his concurring 
opinion explained the effect of the subject statute (then Sec. 104-55-1 
R.S. 1933) as follows: 
Consequently, it transpires that not only must there be but 
one action for the recovery of the debt, but that the judgment 
obtained in said action must first provide for the sale of the 
security, unless proper allegation and proof is made that the 
security has become valueless, and that the only personal judgment 
that can be obtained is a deficiency judgment. This is a judgment 
obtained in the one action according to the provisions of that 
chapter and in no other way. 
Here the lower court did not confine its Judgment of November 23, 
1981 (R 29, 30) to 11adjudging the amount due, with costs and disbursement, 
and th e s a 1 e of the mortgage property 11 as prov i de d i n Sec . 7 8- 3 7 - 1 , but 
entered a personal judgment against the appellant defendants which was 
docketed in violation of Sec. 78-37-2 which provides. that the personal 
judgment "must then be docketed" (emphasis added), the "then" clearly 
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referring to the time when "if it appears from the return of the officer 
making the sale that the proceeds are insufficient as a balance still 
remaining due.'' The withholding of a personal judgment to the latter 
time is essential as. a practical matter to enforce the statutory mandate 
of Sec. 78-37-2 that "no general execution shall issue until after the 
sale of the mortgaged property and the application of the amount realized 
as aforesaid." Thus the lien on all of appellants' real property interest 
in Utah since the judgment date has been wrongful and should be corrected 
by the decision in this case. 
The foregoing goes to the procedure, form, and timing of the personal 
judgment. What about the substance thereof, especially the amount of the 
judgment? Sec. 78-37-1 provides that the Court must adjudicate the Mamount 
due." Does that mean in a situation, such as this, where the sellers are 
themselves buying on contract that the amount is the gross amount due 
from the buyers or the net amount due? Since the purchaser at the 
sheriff's sale must satisfy the lien of the sellers' seller in order to 
own the property it would constitute unjust enrichment for the buyers 
to be subject to a deficiency judgment on the difference between the 
gross sum due and the proceeds of the sheriff's sale since the latter 
would be (or should be) based on the value of the property less the sum 
owing to the sellers' seller (difference being that between gross and 
net above). 
In the instant case it is apparent that the sum found to be due was 
the gross sum, not the net sum,and thus there was error in fixing that 
amount. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The trial court erred in entering any summary judgment before 
trying the material facts that were genuinely disputed and in failing to 
grant a new trial on the issue of the application of funds paid by 
appellants to respondents• seller. Respondents• Complaint did not state 
a cause of action and the entry of judgment based on paragraph 16C of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract in question was error as there is no 
proof in the record that respondents did "pass title to the Buyer 11 
within the meaning of that term. The entry of a personal judgment 
against appellants was also in error as their interest in the subject 
property has never been sold pursuant to Sec. 78-37-1, U.C.A. 1953, and 
thus there has been no return of sale, a condition precedent to the docket-. 
ing of any deficiency judgment as provided in the next section. Therefore, 
this cause should be remanded to the District Court of Utah County with 
instructions to permit the filing of the proposed Amended Answer and to 
try the case on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted 
/Q~~e~ 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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